At Flashscore, we looked back over the last two years and saw how INEOS has got things wrong time and again. Inevitably, the head coach is always on the chopping block, and although Michael Carrick is safe for at least another week, he is a dead man walking and will be the next to pay for the incompetence above him. But how did Man Utd reach a point where they face their second relegation battle since INEOS joined the club?
When assessing that period and their time as minority owners, we looked at player recruitment and head-coach appointments and sackings. This first part of the story is critical for INEOS: player recruitment, followed by Part 2, which looks at managerial appointments/sackings.
Read Part 2 about managerial moves here!
Player recruitment
When Sir Jim Ratcliffe and INEOS bought a 27.7% stake in Man Utd in February 2024, Erik ten Hag was the manager. The Dutchman had pretty much free rein to sign whoever he wanted, and before INEOS was appointed, he went with an Ajax and Dutch-heavy approach. Most of Ten Hag's signings were ultimately deemed expensive failures, from splashing £85m to sign his former player Antony to sign Dutch full-back Tyrell Malacia, and the less said about that signing, the better.
And when you consider how deeply unpopular the Glazer family are at Old Trafford, it is no surprise that supporters were optimistic when INEOS came in and said from now on, they were going to take charge of transfer dealings as opposed to the manager and hire coaches in line with the style of football Man Utd should be looking to play.
INEOS still signed two Dutch players in their first summer window, Joshua Zirkzee and Matthijs de Ligt, but also signed talented centre-back Leny Yoro from Rennes, Noussair Mazraoui and Manuel Ugarte, three players with no connection to Dutch football.
It was a clear change of direction; control shifted from Ten Hag to the Sporting Director Dan Ashworth.
Aside from the new approach to transfer dealings, transfer fees were lower than previously under the Glazers. The messaging was that the club were broke, riddled with debt and needed to be more sensible in the transfer market.
By the time the following summer came around, Man Utd were coached by Ruben Amorim and the new Sporting Director was Jason Wilcox, after the club backtracked on Dan Ashworth just five months after breaking their backs to hire him.
And following his promotion, Wilcox altered the approach somewhat. The budget was still relatively tight but United funded £220m in player signings by loaning out Marcus Rashford to Barcelona and receiving various sell-on fees.
The new approach was to fix one position at a time and the plan for summer 2025 was to fix the attack. They made four signings, three of which were forwards. Man Utd brought in Matheus Cunha, Bryan Mbeumo, Benjamin Sesko and keeper Senne Lammens for a combined £220m or thereabouts.
At the time, the media and Man Utd fans praised it as savvy business, bringing in mostly Premier League-proven players. However, Man Utd had glaring midfield problems that continued to be neglected, and in hindsight, they also needed better depth in defence.
And again, with hindsight, INEOS' approach to signing specific players for Amorim's system was a huge risk. Because unless they really intended to stick by Amorim no matter what, several of the signings only made sense in Amorim's unique three-at-the-back formation. So when Carrick came in as interim boss after the club decided not to stick with Amorim in January this year, INEOS had created another long-term headache for the club.
As we moved into the summer just gone, Wilcox and CEO Omar Berrada turned their attention to the midfield after being left with a Casemiro-sized hole, and this new approach to transfer windows became more curious.
Signing Youri Tielemans for a respectable £35m (after triggering his release clause) and Carlos Baleba for £70m from Brighton wasn't the worst business on paper. They weren't the club's first or second options, but when INEOS were reluctant to spend big money on an Elliot Anderson or Sandro Tonali, Wilcox did okay with the options he had.
However, signing Andrey Santos for a reported £50m when the club desperately needed better depth at full-back, centre-back and up front was inexcusable. When tight on funds, the Sporting Director's hands are tied to a degree but a good Sporting Director would find smart solutions and ensure each signing made is vital to the squad and well scouted.
Instead, Wilcox failed to back Carrick even close to the level needed after Carrick turned Man Utd's 2025/26 season around by securing a top three finish and Champions League football.
Verdict - Even if you were being kind and said INEOS have had a mixed bag when it comes to player signings, they have shown a real lack of ambition in the market; they have had more misses than hits when it comes to signings and their inability to sell players summer after summer is deeply concerning. Also, their strategy of fixing one position at a time is ludicrous because football is too fast-moving and unpredictable to neglect an area of the pitch for two seasons in a row, as they have now done with the defence.
Also, signing players like Patrick Dorgu and Cunha for a three-at-the-back system under Amorim has proven naive, as the club are left with two players who don't really have an obvious place in Carrick's 4-3-3 system.
The reality is, whether you think INEOS have good intentions or not, they have made so many poor recruitment decisions, and in last summer's window, they left their head coach out to dry.
They deserve all the criticism coming their way, as ultimately Carrick will pay the price for their failings.
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Harry Dunnett is a global editor for Flashscore, specialising in English football. An intrepid traveller who has spent time in South and Central America, Harry enjoys visiting new stadiums and experiencing sport and culture all over the world. Currently residing in the Midlands, you can read his latest articles here.
