It's just one stat among many: the luxury tax, designed to penalise teams that do not respect the salary cap, was introduced in the NBA in 2003. And for the first time, two teams that have not been penalised by this tax will face each other in the finals: the Oklahoma City Thunder and the Indiana Pacers.
This marks a turning point. Admittedly, there have been a few champions who have not had to pay taxes (the Warriors in 2015 and 2017, the Lakers in 2020), but in recent years, the amounts have exploded. What is surprising is that the salary cap has never been as high as it has been over the last 10 years, but that has not stopped franchises from getting bogged down in penalties.
For the first time in history, more than 10 teams (11 in total) paid luxury tax this season. And the team paying the most was... the Phoenix Suns, at over $150,000,000! Quite a lot when you consider that they didn't even qualify for the playoffs. But more generally, such a boom seems logical in this age of superteams.
Except that of the 10 teams that have spent the most on luxury tax since its creation, four are still waiting for a title: the Clippers, the Knicks, the Nets and the Suns. The first three teams are indisputably based in the league's two biggest markets - New York and Los Angeles - and feature in the top eight of the highest-value franchises. Yet further proof that money cannot buy success.
OKC (3.65 billion) and Indiana (3.6 billion) are 21st and 22nd, respectively. These are among the NBA's smallest markets. Two cities with less than a million inhabitants, two states far from the coast, considered to be 'country', and which last season were still among the eight worst average attendances in the NBA (the Pacers were even second last).
So how did these two cities, clearly unattractive for free agency, make it to the finals? By doing what every front office is supposed to do: think. But above all, by taking risks on transfers to build around a player with superstar potential.
When, in 2022, Indiana sacrificed Domantas Sabonis to get Tyrese Haliburton, everyone cried madness. Not because of the point guard's potential - widely heralded as a crack shot - but because he would give the Kings a top-five NBA pivot. Three years later, the Pacers are in the final, Sacramento are languishing around eighth place, and nobody is asking the question anymore.
The case of the Thunder is far more famous: in 2019, OKC sent Paul George, then third in the MVP, to the Clippers to pick up a mountain of draft picks. Most crucially, they obtained Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, a promising rookie who we thought would become a star, but probably not the superstar and MVP he is today. One of the greatest examples of a trade in which the beneficiary is not the one announced at the time of the deal, since the Clippers have done no better than a conference final.
The management of each franchise relied on these two jewels to build a real team, making well-thought-out decisions and, above all, emphasising the complementary nature of each piece. The development of youngsters has been a success for both teams, with Jalen Williams an all-star at OKC, and players like Cason Wallace, Andrew Nembhard, Aaron Nesmith and many others perfectly integrated with a real role in each team. Hard work that pays off.
And it allows them to take risks. Indiana have put their faith in Pascal Siakam, a veteran who is already a champion, to bring much-needed postseason experience to this young team.
Despite his big contract, the move was a success, as evidenced by his conference finals MVP award. OKC, for their part, needed toughness above all else, and they gambled heavily on Isaiah Hartenstein at a price that may seem enormous for his relatively low production, but his contribution goes beyond the stats. Above all, these are two examples of transfers where players are expected to perform their duties collectively, rather than adding a 'name' and seeing if they fit in.
The work of scouting and reflection is not dead: teams have not hesitated to take risks, to sacrifice promising players on paper (like Josh Giddey, sent to Chicago to get Alex Caruso back from the play-offs at OKC, or Buddy Hield, discarded to make room for youngsters at Indiana). Whatever the choices, they were always made in the interests of the team.
But above all, they are choices that run counter to the current trend: to combine stars, no matter why, no matter how. Many front offices are unable to reverse the balance of power when they have a superstar in their squad, and for fear that he might leave, they will look for a second, or even a third, to please the current leader. And too bad if it does not work, if it does not fit.
Phoenix with the Devin Booker - Kevin Durant - Bradley Beal trio is obviously the best example of this, but in recent history alone, big-name combinations have rarely worked (Russell Westbrook - Paul George - Carmelo Anthony in... OKC, or Kevin Durant - James Harden - Kyrie Irving at the Nets for the most recent crash of this kind of model).
The NBA has toughened penalties for owners who do not care about paying taxes, now hitting teams with the possible loss of draft picks, for example. To avoid overly blatant imbalances?
That is doubtful, because the NBA loves stars and big markets. Yet, the success of the Thunder and the Pacers is simply a glaring example to those who think that money buys titles: a well-constructed collective, which gives as much in attack as in defence, and whose leader magnifies each game, that is what we call a team. And, the last time I checked, basketball is a team sport. Without doubt, the best news that fans of the orange ball and the NBA could have received.
